January 2015
Is academic freedom best justified on the basis of the
Millian view, the view, due largely
to John Stuart Mill, that academic freedom is necessary for the advancement of
knowledge? Or is academic freedom best justified on the basis of the
Dworkin-Mercer view, the view, due
largely to Ronald Dworkin and Mark Mercer, that academic freedom is necessary
for the advancement of intellectual autonomy? How we choose to answer these
questions turns out to be of more than theoretical interest.
Academic freedom is the freedom scholars, researchers, artists, librarians, archivists and
students have to go about their work unencumbered by non-academic interference.
It protects professors, students, staff and alumni from having to accept any
form of ‘party line.’ It gives universities the independence they need to
establish academic programs as they see fit. It gives people within universities
the right to advance popular and unpopular ideas, free from the threat of
discrimination or reprisal, whether from government officials or from their own
university administrators. Academic freedom gives people the right to have their
work evaluated according to academic, rather than non-academic, criteria. It is
what gives academics and academic institutions the independence they need to
carry out their work.
Academic freedom is thus an instrumental rather than a non-instrumental good. It
exists to help academics do what is expected of them. In this sense, it is more
like a civil right than a
human right. Human rights, such as
the right to life, are often best thought of as intrinsic goods. They are not
conditional on any particular goal or purpose. They protect things that are good
in and of themselves. Civil rights, in contrast, are the rights we need
qua citizen. They are the rights
people need for citizens and governments to stand in the proper relationship to
one another. In the absence of the institution of government, there would be
little need for the right to vote.
This distinction can sometimes become muddled if we fail to notice that some
rights have more than one underlying justification. Free speech, for example,
turns out to be a human right since
it is an intrinsic good, a good in and of itself. It also turns out to be a
civil right, since it is essential,
practically speaking, for the selection of democratic governments. But in
addition, it also turns out to be an
academic right, since it is also essential, practically speaking, for the
advancement of academic goals and objectives.
It follows that if academic freedom is an instrumental good, we need to become
clear about which academic goals and objectives we are hoping to advance. Put
another way, we need to become clear about the university’s main mission. We
need to know why taxpayers, granting agencies, students and parents all fund
universities as they do. Or at least why they
should do so.
The advantages of the Millian line – that the main mission of the university is
to advance knowledge – are twofold. First, knowledge is largely accepted as an
uncontroversial good. Whether in medicine, engineering or the humanities,
advances in knowledge are widely understood to be of benefit to all humankind.
The second advantage is that knowledge – especially scientific knowledge – is
largely understood to be something objective, something that governments and
other paymasters can measure and quantify, at least to some modest degree. If
so, the only point of controversy will be over how much knowledge we can afford.
The only questions of public policy will be about budgets.
In contrast, the advantages of the Dworkin-Mercer line – that the main mission
of the university is to encourage intellectual autonomy – may be less familiar
to many of us. Increased intellectual autonomy often leads to a greater
diversity of ideas. Sometimes this diversity of ideas leads to new intellectual
discoveries. But just as often, it is this diversity of viewpoints that seems to
lead to entrenched social differences. Reasonable people, after considering
complex social or religious issues, often simply end up agreeing to disagree.
Advances in genuine intellectual autonomy are also harder to measure. While the
Millian view focuses on measurable increases in knowledge, the Dworkin-Mercer
view focuses on the scholar or student as agent. Philosophers from Aristotle to
Kant have believed this leads, in the long run, not only to increased knowledge,
but also to better, more fulfilling lives. Democrats from Socrates to Locke have
believed that this also leads to more stable, peaceful societies. But who among
us is willing to wait for the long run? Quite reasonably, the taxpayer may ask,
how are we to know whether we are getting our money’s worth?
Perhaps not surprisingly, it is for these reasons that it has been the Millian
view that has captured most often the attention of the scholar and the taxpayer
alike. It has also been the Millian view that has motivated the huge shift in
resources away from the humanities and towards the sciences over the past
century.
Even so, for those of us who want to assert that both goals are worth pursuing,
there may be some good that results from tragic events such as the recent
shootings at the Charlie Hebdo
offices in Paris. Such events may motivate us to seek a greater balance between
these two aspects of the university’s mission, between the advancing of
objective, mostly scientific, knowledge on the one hand, and the kind of
individual, intellectual autonomy most often associated with the study of the
humanities on the other.
As citizens and governments around the world begin to ask themselves what it is
that distinguishes the West from other, less peaceful and less tolerant parts of
the world, we should remind ourselves of the importance of those aspects of
Western society that are most often associated with the goal of promoting
individual intellectual autonomy in our students and in our citizens. These
include a universal franchise, the separation of church and state, the rule of
law, free markets and, something not unrelated to each of these, academic
freedom within the university.
Andrew Irvine is
Head of Economics, Philosophy, and Political Science at UBC, Okanagan.
He is also a member of the SAFS Board of Directors.
Help us maintain freedom in teaching, research and scholarship by joining SAFS or making a donation.
